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The principal question for consideration is whether the 
United States should enact “[a] statute enabling censorship of 
Internet material” along the lines described in Bambauer, Or-
well’s Armchair.1 The article will not be reproduced here, alt-
hough it rewards careful reading. Rather, the present emphasis 
will be on certain structural features of Professor Bambauer’s 
argument, with particular reference to some of the institutional 
issues they raise. 
I.  INTRODUCTORY NOTES AND QUERIES ON TERMINOLOGY 
1. Professor Bambauer’s subject is Internet filtering: how 
governments do it, what forces constrain it, and what is to be 
done about it. The essential characteristic of such filtering is 
that Internet intermediaries—Internet service providers like 
Comcast and Verizon, search engines like Google and Bing, do-
main name providers, and the like—design their systems to 
make some content inaccessible. Professor Bambauer unapolo-
getically describes this filtering as “censorship.”2 What justifies 
the term? Is it simply a matter of linguistic precision, or does the 
term have a rhetorical force of its own? Given that he is propos-
ing a censorship statute, what explains his willingness to em-
brace this ordinarily pejorative term? 
2. If censorship is the systematic suppression of speech, does 
it matter how a censor acts? Consider the “modalities of regula-
tion” framework described in Lessig, The Law of the Horse: 
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What Cyberlaw Might Teach.3 Professor Lessig argues that from 
the regulator’s perspective, the four modalities—law, norms, 
markets, and code—are substitutes for each other. What is fil-
tering, then, but code-based online censorship? Compare an of-
fline censor who burns books or cuts words out of letters with an 
online censor who cuts network links or blocks packets. Does the 
analogy hold? Does it shed any light on Professor Bambauer’s 
use of the term “censorship?” 
II.  NOTES AND QUERIES ON HARD AND SOFT CENSORSHIP 
1. Orwell’s Armchair opens with an analytical distinction 
that will be central to what follows: between “hard” and “soft” 
forms of censorship through filtering.4 There are two forms of 
hard censorship: 
In direct control, the government installs filters on comput-
er infrastructure that it owns.5 
 
In deputization, the government orders private intermediar-
ies to install filters on infrastructure that they own.6 
They are contrasted with three forms of soft censorship: 
In pretext, the government uses unrelated laws to impose 
filtering.7 
 
In payment, the government offers rewards to intermediar-
ies who install filters.8 
 
In persuasion, the government uses the bully pulpit to pres-
sure intermediaries to install filters.9 
What justifies the labels of “hard” and “soft?” All filters are code. 
The reader who is unable to obtain a copy of Emmanuel Gold-
stein’s The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Computation be-
cause of Internet filtering is equally unable whether the filter is 
mandated by law or “voluntarily” deployed by a nominally private 
actor. Would it be more accurate to say that what is firmer or 
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squishier is the nature of governmental influence on the persons 
who control the filter code? To say that the distinction is be-
tween direct and indirect forms of control over filtering? To say 
that Professor Bambauer is making not merely a procedural 
point about how censorship happens but also an institutional 
point about who does the censoring? 
2. Professor Bambauer argues that the government’s use of 
hard censorship is substantially more constrained by law than 
its use of soft censorship.10 If so, who is it that is doing the con-
straining? Comrade O’Brien seems unlikely to respect the Con-
stitution simply because it is the Constitution. He will have to 
be reined in by the courts, will he not? And courts’ willingness to 
take up these reins will depend on the strength or weakness of 
their institutional position and the strength or weakness of the 
popular consensus against the pernicious ideas contained in 
Goldstein’s tract. If the sober jurisprudential conversation posit-
ed in Orwell’s Armchair is a conversation that can only take 
place in certain political and institutional climates, does it seem 
likely that the present United States is such a climate? Does the 
collapse of the proposed filter-mandating Stop Online Piracy 
Act11 (SOPA) in January 2012 due to vehement popular protests 
count as pretty good evidence that it is? 
3. Why might it be that the law is hard on hard censorship 
but soft on soft censorship? Is this a simple failure of the judici-
ary to do its job of policing the legislature and executive in cases 
where the latter have not acted according to law? Is the greater 
difficulty of checking soft censorship through law reflective of an 
inherent institutional incapacity on the part of the judiciary? 
a. What is deputization but official censorship plain and 
simple? Is there anything to distinguish ordering Verizon to 
install anti-Goldstein filters from ordering a bookstore to 
remove his book from its shelves? Is there any possibility 
that the courts would now make such a distinction? Was 
there ever a time when there was, and if so, what has 
changed? 
b. Is direct control truly out of the question? Does the 
fact that most Internet infrastructure is privately owned 
mean that the public-forum question has never been square-
ly posed? If Comrade O’Brien were to nationalize the Ameri-
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can portions of the Internet and install filters, is there any 
serious question about the outcome of the resulting First 
Amendment challenge? 
c. Should we perhaps understand pretext as hard cen-
sorship in sheep’s clothing? Given that the very point of pre-
text is to circumvent the normal limits on legislative action, 
it can hardly be presumptuous to expect the courts to look 
behind pretextual rationales and judge legislation according 
to its actual effects. Or can it? 
d. Do payment and persuasion stand on somewhat dif-
ferent ground because the legislature acts through means 
other than the creation of primary private duties? What is it 
about the use of the power to appropriate and the power to 
jawbone that renders them less susceptible to oversight? 
III.  NOTES AND QUERIES ON LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE 
CENSORSHIP 
1. Professor Bambauer argues that it is possible to distin-
guish “legitimate” from “illegitimate” censorship. In particular, 
he writes, “Legitimate censorship has four virtues: it is openly 
described, transparent about what it restricts, narrow in the 
material to which it applies, and accountable to the people it 
seeks to protect.”12 Can there be any serious question that ac-
countable censorship is better than unaccountable censorship, 
that focused censorship is better than clumsy censorship, and so 
on? How general are these propositions? Are they specific to cen-
sorship, or are they applications of more general legal norms? 
2. Professor Bambauer refers to his criteria as a “process-
based methodology”13 and defends them as being “compatible 
with divergent views on what material should be banned.”14 How 
far can procedural criteria go in settling questions about censor-
ship? Does it follow that because procedurally regular censor-
ship is more legitimate than procedurally irregular censorship, 
it is legitimate in an absolute as well as a relative sense? Is this 
a question that can be settled in the abstract, without reference 
to the material to be censored? Is it right that whether Winston 
Smith shall be permitted to read The Theory and Practice of Ol-
igarchical Computation should turn only on the process Com-
rade O’Brien follows and not on the contents of the book? But if 
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it is necessary to make normative judgments about whether par-
ticular material can appropriately be censored, is it possible to 
say anything about global censorship that does not rest on con-
tested moral and social values? Is Professor Bambauer’s theory 
an attempt to apply a quintessentially liberal methodology—
procedural justice—to a quintessentially illiberal subject—
censorship? 
3. Can Professor Bambauer’s procedural criteria be under-
stood in institutional terms? What are openness, transparency, 
and narrowness but basic conditions that legal norms must ful-
fill if they are properly to be called “law” at all? And what is ac-
countability but a demand that legal norms must originate from 
the political branches of government? Is it fair to say that a fil-
tering decision that satisfies the procedural criteria is an insti-
tutional settlement of a contested question, that is, a decision 
duly arrived at as the result of duly established procedures by 
the institution best suited to make decisions of this type? Is it 
therefore entitled to deference from other actors in the system, 
namely courts? 
4. Is there something about the structure of filtering deci-
sions that renders them particularly unsuitable for generation—
as opposed to application—by the courts? One facet of China’s 
experience may be instructive here. The state apparatus respon-
sible for filtering decisions issues ill-defined but binding state-
ments of general (and frequently shifting) policies, which inter-
mediaries are expected to implement on their own.15 Dramatic 
and unpredictable overblocking is the predictable result. Has 
Professor Bambauer endorsed a clear-statement rule for filter-
ing, under which Congress is permitted to require online censor-
ship but must make its intent unmistakable and provide precise 
direction when it deviates from a background norm against cen-
sorship? Or might it be that a clear statement in favor of censor-
ship is precisely the one thing courts know they must not per-
mit, so that the entire subterfuge of soft censorship is in fact a 
legal fiction willingly acquiesced in by all parties? 
5. Professor Bambauer easily concludes that hard censor-
ship is more legitimate than soft.16 How could it be otherwise? 
a. Deputization—the creation of primary private du-
ties—will ordinarily require the open and accountable en-
 
 15 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), World Report: 2006 245–47 (HRW and Seven 
Stories Press 2006), online at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf (visited Feb 
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actment of legislation. The enforcement of those duties by 
the judiciary will ordinarily require transparency. Narrow-
ness is a property of the fit between the two. The procedural 
legitimacy of deputization is almost tautological, is it not? 
b. Direct control is an interesting middle case. Does di-
rect control locate day-to-day control of the infrastructure in 
the executive rather than in the legislature? Is it problematic 
if it does? How plausible is it that government-operated 
routers would be open to the kinds of public scrutiny neces-
sary to verify the nature of the filtering actually being en-
gaged in? Would such information properly be the subject of 
a FOIA request? On what statutory grounds, if any, might 
Comrade O’Brien colorably deny such a request? Does it 
matter whether the government is acting as proprietor or as 
sovereign? Is there a difference? Is direct control just pay-
ment writ large? If so, does it still deserve the designation of 
“hard” censorship? 
c. Pretext is by definition illegitimate, is it not? Would 
the answer change if “pretext” were described instead as “the 
routine application of general legal norms to online activi-
ties?” If a domain name facilitates illegal gambling activity, 
why should it be any less subject to seizure than other prop-
erty used in facilitating gambling? Or is this rhetorical shift 
itself a kind of pretext precisely analogous to the pretext in-
volved in applying anti-gambling laws to domain names? Is 
the danger that pretext works precisely because labels mat-
ter and courts have difficulty looking behind them to under-
stand the actual consequences for speech? On the other 
hand, is there anything wrong with pretextual legislation or 
pretextual prosecution, as long as the legislation or prosecu-
tion itself could be independently and honestly justified? Put 
another way, does the focus on pretext inappropriately pro-
ject a judicial virtue on branches of government where it 
does not apply? Or is the point that these other branches 
may act pretextually, but they may not conscript the courts 
in their rhetorical shell game? 
d. After National Federation of Independent Business v 
Sebelius,17 do courts now possess meaningful criteria to limit 
Congress’s use of its power of the purse to inhibit speech?18 
Or is an analysis that depends on distinguishing the gov-
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ernment-as-funder from the government-as-censor necessari-
ly intractable? Consider the similar difficulties besetting 
campaign finance and telecommunications law, two other ar-
eas in which government subsidies for speech coexist uneasi-
ly with government regulations of speech. If the power to tax 
is the power to destroy, is the power to spend the power to 
censor? 
e. Is persuasion the least law-like of the modalities of 
censorship? Is it anything more or less than the threat of leg-
islation without the substance? Is it better described as cor-
ruption? As extortion? Or is it sometimes a form of grand-
standing, in which officials take demagogic positions for 
political gain? If that is right, then does it perhaps score 
highly on openness since the officials must identify them-
selves publicly with the censorial goal in order to reap the 
demagogue’s political rewards? And does this suggest that a 
theory of accountability must include a fairly rich account of 
the political process and must mean something more than 
just accountability to a majority of the relevant electorate? Is 
the problem with persuasion that it permits individual offi-
cials to usurp the authority of the institutions to which they 
belong? 
6. Is there a connection between the greater legal con-
straints on hard censorship and its greater legitimacy? Is the 
more exacting judicial scrutiny of deputization the cause of its 
greater adherence to rule-of-law virtues? Or is it the fact that 
deputization acts through the prototypical mechanisms of law 
that makes it susceptible to meaningful oversight? Are the forms 
of governmental action used in soft censorship deviations from 
the Platonic ideal of lawmaking, or are they indispensable ele-
ments of the lawmaking enterprise? 
IV.  NOTES AND QUERIES ON NONLEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON 
CENSORSHIP 
1. Law is not the only possible check on official censorship. 
Professor Bambauer argues that the other three modalities—
code, markets, and norms—should also be understood as ways to 
limit censorship.19 Can law also be an antiregulatory force? If 
not, what makes it different? Recall Professor Lessig’s corollary 
that law can commandeer the other three modalities for regula-
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tory purposes20 and Professor Bambauer’s claim that 
deputization—law mandating code—is a form of hard censor-
ship. If the four modalities are all tools deployed by actors in a 
complex global ecosystem to influence each others’ conduct, what 
remains of Professor Lessig’s original insight that these modali-
ties are regulatory substitutes? Is the answer perhaps that we 
should be clearer about distinguishing how a regulatory modali-
ty is applied to its subject from the political economy of how reg-
ulation is developed and deployed? In considering the following 
questions about the effectiveness of the other antimodalities, 
due regard should be given to the institutional setting: the reac-
tion by private parties to the situation in which they find them-
selves as a result of governmental or quasi-governmental action. 
a. To what extent are the merits and demerits of code as 
a check on filtering captured by the phrase “arms race”? Giv-
en that software can be replicated and distributed at near-
zero cost, how is it that government attempts to target cir-
cumvention code can be expected to raise the costs of circum-
vention? Does the United States’ experience with 
anticircumvention rules in the digital rights management 
context suggest that legal prohibitions on circumvention 
tools in the filtering context will be effective or ineffective?21 
Filtering-circumvention tools are most commonly used today 
in countries with politically repressive regimes.22 Is there 
anything about this experience that might be unlikely to 
translate to the United States? If so, what does it imply 
about the effectiveness of a domestic anticircumvention law? 
b. Professor Bambauer points to high concentration in 
Internet infrastructure markets as a reason that market 
forces may be an ineffective check on filtering.23 What ever 
happened to “The Net interprets censorship as damage and 
routes around it”?24 How much of this concentration is essen-
tial to the existence of a single, unified Internet, and how 
 
 20 See Lessig, 113 Harv L Rev at 512–13 (cited in note 3). 
 21 See, for example, Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103(a), Pub L No 105-304, 
112 Stat 2860, 2863–64 (1998), codified at 17 USC § 1201(a) (declaring that “[n]o person 
shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access” to certain cop-
yrighted materials, and barring distribution of circumvention tools). 
 22 See, for example Cormac Callanan, et al, Leaping over the Firewall: A Review of 
Censorship Circumvention Tools 46–57 (Freedom House 2011), online at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Censorship.pdf (visited 
Feb 16, 2013). 
 23 Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 920 (cited in note 1). 
 24 See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, Time (Dec 6, 1993) (quota-
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much is the accidental result of historical factors and politi-
cal choices? If existing intermediaries are unwilling to offer 
access to censored material for which there is demand, will 
this create countervailing market pressures for disruptive 
new intermediaries to develop alternative forms of access? If 
not, what structural features of these markets might explain 
their resistance to entry? 
c. Professor Bambauer argues that norms are an imper-
fect constraint on soft censorship because their strength var-
ies with the community and with the material to be blocked. 
If true, is this fact an argument for or against his process-
based methodology? He further argues that clever framing 
by censors and collective action problems will inhibit the de-
velopment of antifiltering political movements. What then of 
the SOPA protests from January 2012?25 Were they an aber-
rational moment in an otherwise unbroken narrative of pub-
lic complacency? Is their vehemence to be explained by the 
fact that it was hard censorship at stake rather than soft? Or 
do they imply that norms can sometimes be an effective 
check on soft censorship? 
2. Professor Bambauer suggests that it is paradoxical that 
soft censorship is primarily constrained by practical limits such 
as the availability of funds rather than by any principled lim-
its.26 Is this so surprising in light of his arguments about the ab-
sence of principled limits? If soft censorship were truly uncon-
strained in all ways, would we not expect to see it used with 
impunity and ubiquity? Since soft censorship remains the excep-
tion rather than the norm, must it not be the case that there are 
some limits on it somewhere? And having ruled out legal limits, 
should we not expect that the actual limits are pragmatic? 
Would it be fair to say that while government has many tools at 
its disposal, none of them are free? That just as payment draws 
on the public fisc, persuasion also draws on political capital, and 
that neither can be spent without limit? If all censorship, hard 
and soft, operates within these budgetary constraints, how 
might this fact be employed to prevent censorship or to channel 
it in the direction of greater legitimacy? 
 
 25 See Jenna Wortham, Protest on Web Takes On 2 Bills Aimed at Piracy, NY 
Times A1 (Jan 18, 2012). 
 26 Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 926–27 (cited in note 1). 
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V.  NOTES AND QUERIES ON THE DRAFTING OF A HYPOTHETICAL 
INTERNET-FILTERING STATUTE 
1. Professor Bambauer outlines a potential federal Internet 
filtering statute.27 The features and likely effects of such a 
scheme will be considered presently, but first some attention 
should be given to the drafter’s apparent attitude toward his hy-
pothetical statute. He pointedly declines to endorse the proposi-
tion that “interdicting online content is normatively desirable.”28 
But consider the following quotations from his Article: 
[I]f hard censorship is more legitimate than soft, and society 
determines that government should prevent access to cer-
tain materials, then the federal government should pass 
and implement a statutory scheme for online censorship.29 
. . . 
[H]ard censorship is normatively preferable to soft censor-
ship.30 
. . . 
[O]nline censorship is inevitable: nearly every government 
seeks to block some material on the Net.31 
Does it not follow, by the introduction of a conjunction and the 
application of modus ponens, that the government should enact 
a censorship statute? What then is the significance of Professor 
Bambauer’s normative reservation? Should he be understood as 
arguing that the government is justified in enacting a censor-
ship statute but that he would prefer to be counted as a consci-
entious objector to it? Or is this a lament about the ubiquity of 
online censorship coupled with an attempt to make the best of a 
bad situation? 
2. The defining feature of the Bambauer Act is its extensive 
regime of procedural safeguards. It vests the filtering power ex-
clusively in the US Attorney General, requires prior notice and 
adjudication before the implementation of any filtering request 
and regular review afterwards, sets the government’s burden of 
proof at clear and convincing evidence, permits only narrowly 
tailored blocking, and requires that intermediaries be reim-
bursed for their compliance costs.32 Given Professor Bambauer’s 
 
 27 Id at 927–38. 
 28 Id at 927.  
 29 Id at 868–69.  
 30 Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 870 (cited in note 1).  
 31 Id at 936.  
 32 Id at 931–35. 
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proceduralist jurisprudence, are these provisions a surprise? Are 
there any provisions not on the list that should be added to it? 
Any on the list that could be safely removed? 
3. Can the Bambauer Act be understood in institutional 
terms? Its provisions naturally break down along institutional 
lines. Is that a happy accident of how the Act is explained, or 
does it reflect deeper commitments of the legal philosophy from 
which it springs? 
a. Does restricting filtering authority to the Attorney 
General reflect a judgment about the competence and mo-
tives of the Department of Justice as compared with other 
possible institutions? Should the Attorney General’s authori-
ty be delegable? Compare the list of officials authorized to 
request wiretaps in 18 USC § 2516.33 Should filtering author-
ity be broader or narrower than wiretapping authority? Do 
they raise similar intellectual-freedom concerns? Are the two 
in some sense substitutes for each other? 
b. Do the requirements of prior notice, an opportunity to 
be heard, and review for changed circumstances reflect a 
judgment about the nature of adjudication, a judgment about 
judicial independence, or both? Would an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding before a filtering tribunal within the Department of 
Commerce before an Article I administrative law judge suf-
fice? Is it possible to imagine a category of filtering requests 
so clear-cut, so routine, or so numerous that rulemaking 
would be a suitable alternative procedure? 
c. The Act’s choice of a clear-and-convincing burden of 
proof makes a statement about deference, does it not? Is it fair 
to say that the entire tenor of the Act bespeaks a profound 
skepticism of the motives of executive actors and that the Act 
invites judges to partake of that skepticism? If so, should they 
extend their scrutiny to matters beyond the quantum of 
proof required? For example, would it be appropriate for a 
judge in a filtering case to demand detailed evidence from 
the government even in the face of a procedural default by 
the target of a filtering order? 
d. Who is best positioned to ensure that a filtering order 
is narrowly tailored to the material to be blocked? Professor 
Bambauer’s answer is that intermediaries should be charged 
with implementing the filters “using technically feasible, fi-
nancially reasonable efforts” and should be reimbursed for 
 
 33 18 USC § 2516(1). 
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their efforts.34 What institutions, if any, will be in a position 
to monitor the effectiveness of the filtering as implemented? 
What effect does cost-shifting have on the private incentives 
of intermediaries? 
e. The entire scheme is shot through with attempts to 
make filtering orders both open and transparent. To what 
extent is this goal in tension with the goal of any filtering 
scheme to make certain material unavailable? How far is it 
possible to go in detailing what is being blocked without giv-
ing away the game? In the face of such concerns, who can be 
counted on to ensure that the required disclosures really are 
taking place? It may be instructive to consider the United 
States’ experience with public oversight of executive elec-
tronic surveillance, and the courts’ experience overseeing the 
redaction of court filings.35 
VI.  NOTES AND QUERIES ON THE EFFECTS OF A HYPOTHETICAL 
INTERNET-FILTERING STATUTE 
1. How plausible is it that the United States might actually 
adopt a statute along the lines of the Bambauer Act? Will the 
Act’s rigorous preconditions to filtering orders make it unappeal-
ing to parties who simply wish to limit access to the speech that 
they hate? And how likely is it that free-speech advocates will en-
dorse a statute that purports to authorize official censorship? Is 
the Act the kind of compromise that is politically feasible because 
it shares the pain broadly? Or does it fall in an unhappy medium 
that will satisfy no one? Might Professor Bambauer have other 
reasons for proposing an Act he personally opposes and that 
seems unlikely to be enacted? 
2. What would actually happen if the Bambauer Act were to 
be made law? Would Comrade O’Brien seek to employ the hard-
censorship powers it grants to the government? Is he likely to be 
satisfied with the results? Is Professor Bambauer perhaps play-
ing a game of eleven-dimensional chess with Comrade O’Brien 
by proffering an Act that purports to give him the censorial pow-
er he seeks, while channeling him into procedural devices that 
will be largely ineffective in practice? Or is it more likely that 
Comrade O’Brien will continue to employ the techniques of soft 
 
 34 Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 936 (cited in note 1).  
 35 Consider Peter A. Winn, Judicial Information Management in an Electronic Age: 
Old Standards, New Challenges, 3 Fed Courts L Rev 135, 151 (2009) (describing perva-
sive failures to redact social security numbers from publicly available federal electronic 
court filings). 
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censorship if he runs up against the Bambauer Act’s constraints 
on hard censorship? Is it possible that the Bambauer Act is too 
legitimate? 
3. The question can also be put in institutional terms. 
Would the passage of the Act affect judges’ willingness to coun-
tenance soft censorship? Would their sympathy for soft-
censorship techniques of evasion and deception decrease if the 
government had available a statute on point that it declined to 
proceed under? Or would the same institutional factors that cur-
rently make the courts poor guardians against pretext, payment, 
and persuasion continue to hinder them even with the 
Bambauer Act on the books? Could the Act increase courts’ def-
erence to executive acts of soft censorship by declaring a public 
policy that explicitly tolerates some forms of censorship? Does 
the answer depend on how the Act is drafted? How should a 
principled judge attempt to resolve such questions? Should the 
Bambauer Act be regarded as an institutional settlement of the 
censorship question? 
4. Is Professor Bambauer’s preference for hard censorship 
over soft based on an assumption that the level of online filter-
ing is exogenous to the choice of mechanism? It can hardly be 
gainsaid, can it, that all else being equal we should prefer the 
more legitimate form of censorship? But is it not equally plausi-
ble to say that the level of online filtering is itself in large part 
determined by the mechanisms available? Does legitimate cen-
sorship legitimate censorship? 
 
